model-credibility pack
The model-credibility pack is a model-level AI-documentation factor set and its SHACL profile, anchored on the NIST AI RMF. It applies to the model-card unit (one model’s public documentation) and answers two questions that are kept strictly apart:
| Group | Question | Standard | Factors |
|---|---|---|---|
| A — documentation completeness | does this model document itself? | NIST AI RMF 1.0 | 17 |
| B — evaluation sufficiency | are the reported numbers interpretable as evidence? | NIST AI 800-3 | 5 |
Group B is the addition that renamed the pack. A benchmark score with no uncertainty, no null baseline and no stated context of use is a number, not evidence — and Group B assesses reported results the way ASME V&V 40 assesses a simulation validation study.
It contributes a factor taxonomy, a presence-only completeness profile (SHACL), and a per-pack weakener→factor focus map. The core engine, shapes, and rules are untouched.
uofa report owner/model --pack model-credibility # fetch card + extract + reportuofa report https://huggingface.co/owner/model --pack model-credibility # same, from a model URLuofa report bundle.jsonld --pack model-credibility # a saved/curated bundle (deterministic)Given an HF model id or URL, uofa report fetches the card, extracts factor
statuses, and runs the same report as on a bundle. The readout always states its
extraction provenance (an LLM backend when configured, else an approximate
README keyword scan), a gated/absent card renders an honest no-card notice
rather than a hollow all-weakeners page, and the generated bundle is saved by
default as the auditable, re-runnable source.
Factor set
Section titled “Factor set”Seventeen factors, grouped by the four RMF functions. Presence-only: each factor is
assessed, not-assessed, or scoped-out — there are no 1–5 levels and no risk
tiers. Because the card is one model’s documentation, MEASURE and MAP carry the
weight; several GOVERN/MANAGE subcategories are organizational acts a static card
rarely performs and are marked out-of-scope-at-card-level by default (†), flipped
to assessed only when a card documents them.
| RMF function | Factors |
|---|---|
| GOVERN — governance & accountability | Ownership and accountability †, Intended use, License and usage terms, Out-of-scope use |
| MAP — context & risk framing | Task and domain context, Deployment setting, Known limitations, Affected populations |
| MEASURE — evaluation & analysis | Evaluation metrics, Evaluation methodology, Bias and fairness analysis, Robustness and safety testing, Test and evaluation data |
| MANAGE — risk response & monitoring | Mitigations and safeguards †, Residual risk †, Monitoring and feedback †, Versioning and update policy † |
Each factor traces to an RMF subcategory (full mapping table in the pack README).
SHACL profile
Section titled “SHACL profile”One completeness profile over the factor set: a factor-name enum NodeShape over
uofa:CredibilityFactor, scoped to factors tagged factorStandard "NIST-AI-RMF-1.0"
so it never collides with the vv40/nasa shapes. No level-range shape (presence-only).
Weakeners — 10 pack patterns, plus the reachable core subset
Section titled “Weakeners — 10 pack patterns, plus the reachable core subset”The pack declares 10 patterns of its own, all Group B:
| Pattern | Severity | Fires when |
|---|---|---|
W-EV-GEN-02 | High | a score is generalized with no superpopulation account |
W-EV-DET-03 | High | no determinism / repeat-run policy stated for the evaluation |
W-EV-NULL-04 | High | the score is not calibrated against a null or chance baseline |
W-EV-COU-05 | Critical / High | no stated context of use for the evidence (Critical when --cou scopes a decision) |
W-EV-CAP-06 | Medium | no control for a capability confound |
W-EV-DIV-07 | High | a reported score diverges from an independently furnished one beyond tolerance |
W-EV-SUB-08 | Medium | the measured subject carries no version guarantee |
W-EV-COR-09 | Medium | a reported result is uncorroborated where furnished evidence exists |
COMPOUND-EV-01 | Critical | compound escalation at elevated risk |
COMPOUND-EV-02 | High | a generalized claim with no sampling account |
The two groups are firewalled by rule structure, not by convention. Every Group-B
rule body binds uofa:hasValidationResult, so a card with no reported evaluation
structurally cannot trip one — there is no configuration in which a documentation-only
card produces an evaluation-sufficiency finding. Group A’s shapes are gated on a
matching factorStandard, so the two factor sets stay mutually silent.
A model card carries less structure than a V&V assurance package, so only a subset of the core catalog is reachable. That honest subset is part of the instrument:
- Fire on a card:
W-EP-04(an undocumented factor at the assumed risk level — the main cross-card signal),W-AL-01(evaluation without uncertainty quantification),W-AR-05(evaluation without a comparator),W-ON-02(intended use stated but out-of-scope use undocumented),W-SI-02andW-CON-04(structural). - Cannot fire at the card level (need COU structure / argument hierarchy a card
lacks): the claim- and decision-dependent patterns (
W-EP-01,W-PROV-01,W-AR-02,W-CON-01, …). Recording the non-firing set is part of the honest method.
A model card declares no risk tier, so the profile assesses every card against a
disclosed moderate-risk assumption (MRL 3), stated in the readout’s “What this
model was used for” section — W-EP-04 fires against a stated assumption, not a hidden
input.
Worked examples (suggested, run live)
Section titled “Worked examples (suggested, run live)”The live demo offers three suggested examples; clicking one runs the same live pathway as pasting any model id — fetch the card, extract, report:
| Card | What it shows |
|---|---|
allenai/OLMo-2-1124-13B-Instruct | Well-documented — most factors evidenced, few concerns |
cardiffnlp/twitter-roberta-base-sentiment | Popular but holey — no license stated, metrics by reference only |
DeepChem/ChemBERTa-77M-MTR | Ships no README — the no-card readout; the published chirality limitation is absent because the card is |
The contrast is carried by completeness first; with an LLM backend the typed weakeners explain the gaps, while the no-model heuristic path reports completeness and declines sufficiency. The readout always states which path produced it.