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Unit of Assurance

Machine-verifiable credibility evidence for regulated computational simulation.
v0.10.0 · Live Wed May 27 at NAFEMS Americas

Unit of Assurance

Machine-verifiable credibility evidence for regulated computational simulation. One signed JSON-LD package per Context of Use.

What it is

A decision packaging construct, not another process framework.

From evidence to signed package

From an evidence folder to a signed package.

You don't start in JSON-LD. You start with the PDFs, reports, and configs you already have. Extract proposes a first pass, you review it, and one command signs and validates the result.

01 · PREPARE

Drop your evidence

Source PDFs, validation reports, solver configs, and acceptance criteria into one folder. No layout required.

02 · EXTRACT

uofa extract

A model reads the folder and pre-fills the credibility-factor workbook. One sheet per factor. No RDF knowledge needed.

03 · REVIEW

Open the workbook

Confidence coloring shows where the model was unsure. You correct what it got wrong. This is the checkpoint, not a formality.

04 · IMPORT

uofa import

Reviewed workbook to signed, validated JSON-LD in one command. SHACL completeness and integrity checks included. About 30 seconds.

05 · RULES

uofa rules

Forward-chaining rules flag weakeners and compound credibility risks across the signed package.

uofa · extract → import → rules
$ uofa extract ./evidence --pack vv40 -o assessment.xlsx
  → 13 factors proposed · review confidence flags before import

# ... you review and correct assessment.xlsx ...

$ uofa import assessment.xlsx --pack vv40 --sign --key research.key --check
  ✓ signed · SHACL Complete profile conforms

$ uofa rules assessment.jsonld --pack vv40
  ⚡ 3 weakeners detected

Extract proposes. You verify. Nothing is authoritative until you sign it. Run extract locally with Ollama and your evidence never leaves your environment, or point it at a hosted model if you prefer.

Live demo

Morrison blood pump,
re-expressed in 30 seconds.

Morrison et al. (2019) is the FDA-co-authored worked example for ASME V&V 40. The prose paper deems the model credible for COU 1 and inadequate for COU 2. Re-expressed as UofA evidence packages, the same decisions become signed, hashed, and machine-verifiable.

Same model. Same data. Different model risk. The rule engine surfaces the risk-driven divergence automatically.

Standard
ASME V&V 40-2018
Pack
vv40
COU 1 — MRL 2
Accepted  ·  11 weakeners
COU 2 — MRL 5
Not accepted  ·  18 weakeners (2 compound)
uofa rules morrison/cou2
$ uofa rules packs/vv40/examples/morrison/cou2/uofa-morrison-cou2.jsonld

══════════════════════════════════════════════════════
  UofA Weakener Detection Report
  Input: uofa-morrison-cou2.jsonld
══════════════════════════════════════════════════════

  SUMMARY: 18 weakener(s) detected
  ─────────────────────────────────────────
    Critical:  9
    High:      7
    Medium:    2

  ⚡ W-PROV-01   [Critical]   7 hits
  ⚡ COMPOUND-01 [Critical]   2 hits  → cou2 ×2
  ⚠ W-EP-04     [High]       6 hits
  ⚠ W-ON-02     [High]       1 hit  → cou2-vad
  ⚠ W-AL-02     [Medium]     1 hit  → cou2
  ⚠ W-CON-04    [Medium]     1 hit  → cou2

  ─────────────────────────────────────────
  ⚡ 2 compound inferences — chained reasoning,
    not detectable by standalone SPARQL.